Research

• On the unlikelihood of d-separation
  Itai Feigenbaum, Huan Wang, Shelby Heinecke, Juan Carlos Niebles, Weiran Yao, Caiming Xiong, and Devansh Arpit. Draft available at arXiv 2303.05628 (2023).


• Strategyproofness in kidney exchange with cancellations
  Itai Feigenbaum. WINE 2022.


• Unbalanced matchings in kidney exchange
  Itai Feigenbaum. Draft available at SSRN 3885977 (2021).


• Strategic facility location problems with linear single-dipped and single-peaked preferences
  Itai Feigenbaum, Minming Li, Jay Sethuraman, Fangzhou Wang, and Shaokun Zou. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 34, no. 2 (2020): 1-47.


• Dynamic matching in school choice: Efficient seat reassignment after late cancellations
  Itai Feigenbaum, Irene Lo, Jay Sethuraman, and Yash Kanoria. Management Science 66, no. 11 (2020): 5341-5361.


• Approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location: Minimizing lp norm of costs
  Itai Feigenbaum, Jay Sethuraman, and Chun Ye. Mathematics of Operations Research 42, no. 2 (2017): 434-447.


• Selfish Knapsack
  The Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2017.


• The Magician's Shuffle: Reusing Lottery Numbers for School Seat Redistribution
  Itai Feigenbaum, Irene Lo, Jay Sethuraman, and Yash Kanoria. WINE 2016.